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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will argue that analysis on local government and the central-local relationship 
is generally confined to context and that a consequence of this approach is that theory, 
within this area of scholarship, is viewed as being mutually incompatible.  Specific 
examples of this incompatibility can be found in respect of the works of Loughlin, 
Vincent-Jones and Cooper.  It will be argued that by juxtaposing the work of these three 
writers, it is possible to connect their analyses, beyond the context within which they 
write, but that such a connection cannot be achieved through the mechanism of theory.  
The connection can however be achieved through the use of concepts and the resulting 
analysis is a form of meta-explanation of a particular period of decision making in local 
government and the central-local relationship.     
 
Local Government, The Central-Local Relationship And Public Law Analysis 
 
Local government and its relationship with central government are topics which do not 
attract much attention within public law scholarship.  This is possibly because these are 
areas which are perceived as not raising questions of a wider constitutional or theoretical 
nature since their focus is the internal institutional structure of the state.  When contrasted 
with other areas of public law scholarship, such as regulation and its analysis of rules and 
rule making, particularly in the light of the changes to the formal structure of the state, or 
human rights and its focus upon the relationship between the citizen and the state, local 
government and the central-local relationship can appear irrelevant and even insular. 
 
These perceptions are further enhanced by the manner in which the institution of local 
government is presented.  Local government, for example, is generally represented as 
either as a distinct institution1 or in terms of specific area of decision making, such as 
housing, education or welfare.  Examination of these topics may consider matters such as 
privatisation, de-regulation and human rights, but these issues are not the basis of the 
study.  Generally, analysis is subject specific and is often concerned with particular 
contextual aspects and even technical detail.  Theoretical concerns are generally excluded 
although when included, the theory is ‘borrowed’ and its use is also confined to the 
specific context or subject area concerned.2   
                                                 
∗  I would like to thanks Chris Willmore, Bristol University and Agata Fijalkowski, Lancaster University 
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1   For example, see J. Sharland, A Practical Approach to Local Government Law (London: Blackstone, 
1997) or S. Bailey, Cross on Principles of Local Government Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed, 
1997) 
2   For example, see D. Cowan Housing Law and Policy (London: Macmillan, 1999) where the theory of 
autopoiesis is discussed in the context of housing services. 
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Local Government, The Central-Local Relationship And Theory 
 
Notwithstanding the technical and contextual emphasis within legal analysis on local 
government and the central-local relationship it is possible to identify a theoretical 
element.  The works of Loughlin3, Vincent-Jones4 and Cooper5 are unusual in that, 
whilst varying attention is paid to detail and context, their analyses also address the 
question of the wider role of local government along with its relationship with central 
government.  In other words, and importantly for the purposes of this paper, at the core of 
each analysis is theory. 
                                                
 
Loughlin, for example, argues that in the 1980’s the relationship between central 
government and local government underwent a process of ‘juridification’.  This 
juridification occurred by means of two distinct processes: legalization and restructuring.  
Vincent-Jones creates a model of central-local relationship entitled ‘responsibilization’.  
This model stems from observations made in respect of the ‘responsive benefits’ which 
the policy of compulsory competitive tendering has brought to local authorities.  Benefits, 
Vincent-Jones argues, which have resulted in the emergence of a form of ‘contractual 
governance’.  Cooper argues that there is real pressure on local authorities to disguise 
their decision making as being non-ideological.  Accordingly many decisions are 
presented in terms of neutral factors, such as economics or managerialism.  However, 
many decisions are challenged by citizens who seek to test the ‘boundaries of authority’ 
with the consequence that local authorities govern ‘out of order’.   
 
In terms of theory the works of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and Cooper are diverse, in that 
each presents an analysis of a particular area of decision making, yet none of the works 
are irrelevant, unacceptable or even incorrect in terms of wider context of legal analysis 
on local government and the central-local relationship.  In other words, the analyses are 
 
3   M. Loughlin 'Law, Ideologies and the Political-Administrative System', [1989] Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol. 16, page 21; Legality and Locality: The Role of Law in Central-Local Government (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996); 'The Restructuring of Central-Local Relations' in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), 
The Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 2000), 137  
4   P. Vincent-Jones ‘The Limits of Near-contractual Governance: Local Authority Internal Trading Under 
CCT’ [1994] Journal of Law and Society Vol. 21, page 214; ‘Responsive Law and Governance in Public 
Service Provision: A Future for the Local Contracting State’ [1998] Modern Law Review 362; ‘The 
Regulation of Contractualisation of Quasi-Markets for Public Services’ [1999] Public Law. 304; 
‘Competition and Contracting in the transition from CCT to Best Value: Towards a More Reflexive 
Regulation?’ Public Administration Vol. 77, No 2 1999 (273 - 291); ‘Contractual Governance: 
Institutional and Organizational Analysis’ [2000] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 317; ‘Central-Local 
Relations under the Local Government Act 1999: A New Consensus’ [2000] Modern Law Review 84; 
‘Values and Purpose in Government: Central-Local Relations in a Regulatory Perspective’ [2002] 
Journal of Law and Society 27; ‘Regulating Government by Contract: Towards a Public Law 
Framework’ [2002] MLR 611 
5   D. Cooper Sexing the City (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1994); ‘Local Government and Legal 
Consciousness in the Shadow of Juridification’ [1995] Journal of Law and Society 506; ‘Defiance and 
Non-Compliance: Religious Education and the Implementation Problem’ [1995] Current Legal Problems 
253; ‘Institutional Illegality and Disobedience: Local Government Narratives’ [1996] Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 256; ‘Talmudic Territory? Space, Law and Modernist Discourse’ [1996] Journal of Law 
and Society 529; Governing Out of Order (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1998) 
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just very different, possibly even incompatible to the extent that it could be argued that 
that apart from writing upon the same topic, the only other feature which they share is 
that of theory.   
 




The assertion that a shared feature of all the theorists is that of theory would appear to be 
somewhat simplistic.  However, it is argued that theory, as a shared feature, relates to the 
use of theory as a mechanism for the explanation of knowledge.  In this context theory 
can be seen to perform a dual role; firstly as a form of explanation and secondly, as a 
structure for explanation.  The difference between theory as a form or structure is 
ontological, that is, in the nature of the explanation which is being sought.  It is proposed 
to explore this difference in terms of legal analysis on local government and the central-
local relationship in order to identify how theory is used and how the works of the 
various theorists may be connected through theory. 
 
a.  Theory As A Form of Explanation 
 
Theory, as a form of explanation focuses upon the phenomenon to be understood.  The 
goal of the analysis is to propose an explanation concerning a particular phenomenon 
without offering a specific view about the nature of the structure used to present the 
explanation.  In the context of legal analysis on local government and the central-local 
relationship, this use of theory can be found to operate on a number of levels. 
 
For example, a study which focuses upon the provision of a particular service within the 
context of local government may employ a specific theory as a means of explanation but 
ultimately the outcome of the study is a micro level analysis on the provision of the 
service.  Explanation may be given in respect of the choice of theory but this done with a 
view to enhancing the validity of the study of the particular service rather than offering a 
critique of the chosen theory.  At the meso level a study which, for example, seeks to 
focus upon the use of law within the central-local relationship6 may result in the 
construction of a particular theory.  However, as a form of explanation the focus is the 
constructed theory and not the nature of theory.  Some consideration may be given to the 
nature of the constructed theory but only as a means of justifying its validity.7  Of course, 
the constructed theory may, in turn, become the subject of further testing in order to 
ascertain how accurate the theory actually is.8  The features of the theory may be 
examined but again the outcome is a study on the nature of the particular theory 
concerned rather than the nature of theory per se.  Ultimately, a limitation of micro and 
meso level analysis is their contextual nature and this may make consideration of the 
nature of theory difficult and, it could even be argued, irrelevant.   
                                                 
6   Such as Loughlin.  See n. 3 above 
7   Such as Loughlin’s desire to create a normative theory. See below. 
8   See B. Mauthe, ‘Walls of Illusion: Decision Making and Compulsory Competitive Tendering in Local 
Government unpublished PhD thesis; Above n. 17 (1999) 
 3
 
Within legal analysis on local government and the central-local relationship micro and 
meso level analysis predominates.  Certainly the works of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and 
Cooper fall within the meso level category.  However, the absence of a macro or meta-
level analysis should not preclude its consideration, particularly as meta-explanation may 
provide an able mechanism for connecting the works of the theorists.  Accordingly, a 
number of options can be considered.  The theory of legal pluralism, for example, seeks 
to provide an explanation as to the nature and the authority of law.  These are crucial 
issues within law in general, and jurisprudence in particular and it would appear that such 
an ‘open textured’ theory should be able to accommodate and explain a diverse range of 
analyses which the works of the three theorists represents.  However, as a form of meta-
explanation legal pluralism possesses limitations.  For example, whilst legal pluralism 
may accommodate the work of Cooper, who seeks to include a diverse source of norms, 
Loughlin explicitly seeks to exclude non-official sources of norms and therefore cannot 
be easily incorporated.  In other words, meta-theory as a form of explanation is only 
effective if the parameters contained within the theory to be accommodated allows for 
inclusion.  Alternatively, the theory of constitutional pluralism could, for example be 
used to create a common connection.  All three theorists share a specific parameter, that 
of local government, which does possess a constitutional dimension.  Except that in this 
instance the approach represents a form of unification, as opposed to a form of 
connection.  The meeting of theory occurs by way of lifting the features of the lesser 
theories (those of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and Cooper) in order to converge with the 
reductive elements contained within the dominant theory (that of constitutional 
pluralism).  In other words, any link between the three theorists will occur within the 
context of the theory of constitutional pluralism.  Furthermore, since the link will be 
hierarchical in nature the possibility of a direct linear link between the works of 
Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and Cooper may be remote, difficult or even become 
overwhelmed by the theory of constitutional pluralism.  Ultimately, the ensuing analysis 
may not even offer a form of connection for these theories, but result in the creation an 
enhanced theory of constitutional pluralism.  Such an approach may posses merit if the 
aim is to produce a meta-analysis on local government in terms of the theory of 
constitutional pluralism.  However, since the aim of this paper is to identify a means of 
connecting theory within the context of local government and existing legal analysis on 
this topic, the use of the theory of constitutional pluralism would appear to be 
unwarranted and possibly even divergent.   
 
Ultimately, theory as a form of explanation possesses merit but since its function is to 
provide reasons or to demonstrate why and how a phenomenon has occurred, its role a 
method for connecting theories appears to be limited even when the context for analysis 
is shared.  It could even be argued that theory as form emphasizes, rather than diminishes, 
the incompatibility of the work of the various theorists. 
 
b.  Theory As Explanatory Structure 
 
Theory as an explanatory structure concerns the nature of theory as a mechanism for the 
explanation of knowledge.  It is the nature of theory per se which is the primary focus of 
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analysis rather than the nature a particular theory (or theories) or context.  It is about the 
effect that theory as a structure can have on an explanation rather than how theory can be 
used as a mechanism for explanation.   
 
Legal analysis on local government and the central-local relationship generally focuses 
upon theory as a form of explanation and it is from this perspective the works of 
Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and Cooper are generally presented and evaluated.  Given the 
paucity of analysis within public law regarding the use of theory as an explanatory 
structure, it is proposed to consider further the works of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and 
Cooper in terms of this approach.    
 
Theory As Explanatory Structure And Legal Analysis On Local Government And 
the Central-Local Relationship 
 
Theory as an explanatory structure presumes that there are certain features which theory, 
as a mechanism for the explanation of knowledge, will possess.  It can, for example, be 
argued that key questions which are addressed in respect of every theory are those of how 
and why the theories have been produced.  In other words, perhaps by focusing on 
features such as methodology, perspective and justification, it may be possible to identify 
a connection between the works of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and Cooper.   
 
a.  Methodology 
 




The sources used by the theorists are varied.  Loughlin uses a non-empirical basis in that 
the substance of the analysis is legal rules, such as case law and statute.  Loughlin also 
seeks to specifically exclude non-legal rules, such as administrative rules.  The 
justification for this exclusion is that legal rules are the outcome of constitutional 
processes where procedures for the creation of rules and the control of rule based 
decision making are identifiable and represent a direct response to the values which 
operate within the political arena.  By contrast, the norms and values which underpin the 
development of administrative rules originate within the administrative decision making 
system and are the product of informal, unaccountable professional networks.  
Accordingly, not only do legal rules represent 'reality,'9 they possess legitimacy,10 unlike 
the administrative rules. 
 
Vincent-Jones employs an empirical methodology in that a detailed examination was 
conducted in respect of the CCT transactions developed in a large metropolitan city 
                                                 
9   Above n. 3 (1989) 
10  The legitimacy is a consequence of the fulfilment of certain criteria and values to be found in the process 
by which the rule emerges.  In the context of the theory of juridification of the central-local government 
relationship, Loughlin defines both the criteria and the values, which inevitably results in only legal rules 
possessing legitimacy.  
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council in the north of England.11  The focus was upon the practical impact of CCT and 
the quasi-contractual mechanisms which emerged.  In some respects approach is similar 
to Loughlin’s in that there is a practical basis from which the analysis stems.  However, it 
is possible to argue that the objectivity of Vincent-Jones base is more tangible in that it is 
based on actual observed practices whereas Loughlin focuses upon a series of identifiable 
events12 which lead to outcomes within defined processes, such as, legislative and 
judicial decision making.  These outcomes are then represented as observed facts. 
 
The methodology deployed by Cooper is mixed in that it is part document based and part 
empirical.  However, whereas for Loughlin and Vincent-Jones the purpose of 
methodology is to provide an explanation of a particular event, both actual and perceived, 
from which an understanding is constructed, for Cooper methodology is about the search 
for contingencies.  That is, events or occurrences which can influence the present and the 
future.  A suggested consequence of this difference is that whilst the sources used by 
Loughlin and Vincent-Jones represent certainty, Coopers represents uncertainty and 




Choice relates to the material which will, or will not, be included within the parameters 
of the particular study.  Such decisions are generally represented as being ‘theory neutral’ 
but, it is suggested, the choices which the theorists make have implications of a 
theoretical nature. 
 
As part of the construction of the theory of juridification Loughlin adopts concepts 
developed in the works of earlier theorists writing on local government, such as Elliot13 
and Grant.14  Elliot introduced the concept of 'hierarchy' into legal analysis of the central-
local government relationship which he represented as the differing constitutional status 
of local government and central government.  Grant devised the concept of a ‘central-
local axis’ which incorporates elements of the political, legal and administrative 
relationship that exists between the two tiers of government.  Both these concepts imply 
that the central local-relationship is multi-dimensional.  Hierarchy, for example, suggests 
that there are degrees of control whilst the central-local axis indicates that the relationship 
possesses a linear element in respect of the weight to be accorded to different forms of 
decision making.  Loughlin however chooses to exclude these variances and focus 
exclusively upon legal decision making which he represents as occupying a superior, 
weighted and most importantly, a singular position in respect of the dimensions of 
hierarchy and the linear axis.  How Loughlin is able to achieve this partial selection of 
knowledge is by focusing on those aspects of the concepts which accord with the 
parameters identified as forming the sources from which the theory of juridification will 
                                                 
11   Above n. 4 (1994), 215 
12   Such as the election of the Conservative government in 1979, the ‘market’ philosophy of the new 
Conservative government and the increase in legislation and case law relating to local government 
activities. 
13  M. Elliot, The Role of Law in Central-Local Relations (SSRC, 1981) 
14  M. Grant, ‘Central-Local Relations: The Balance of Power’ in J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), The 
Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1989), 247 
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be based.  Loughlin is then able to select Elliot’s normative analysis on hierarchy, but 
exclude the descriptive constitutional principles which Elliot identified within the central-
local framework.  Furthermore, the descriptive features which Loughlin desires to 
include, that of legal decision making, are relabelled as normative.   
 
The choices made by Vincent-Jones in terms of theory construction are different from 
that of Loughlin.  Whilst Loughlin, from the outset, states that the concern is the wider 
picture of the central-local relationship Vincent-Jones initial analysis focuses upon a 
particular area of local government decision making.  From this pragmatic level the study 
is eventually ‘lifted’ to consider the wider picture.  However, the leap from CCT 
practices to the wider ‘picture’ of the central-local relationship occurs in two stages.  The 
first stage entails altering the context of the study from CCT to the reconciliation of the 
operation of a private law mechanism, contract law, in a public law context, local 
government.  The outcome of this stage is the construction of a model of local 
government which is represented as ‘contractual governance’.  From this the analysis is 
then lifted to consider the wider picture of the central-local relationship.  What is 
particularly interesting about this incremental process is the ‘lifting’ mechanisms 
employed by Vincent-Jones.  In shifting context, for example, concepts are used whilst in 
shifting level, theory is brought into play.  Inherent within the process is the presumption 
that the knowledge found is universal.   
 
Cooper seeks to identify a network of relations and causality over spatial and temporal 
dimensions.15  In terms of Loughlin’s and Vincent-Jones this approach can be articulated 
as Loughlin focusing upon the spatial relationship of central/local government whilst 
Vincent-Jones focuses upon the temporal development of CCT practices.  Cooper seeks 
to abandon these dimensions because they limit the story that can be told.  Ironically 
Cooper, like Loughlin and Vincent-Jones, also focuses upon the exercise of power and 
control, but represents this ‘governmental excess’16 as a testing of the boundaries of the 
state rather than a conflict concerning the possession and control of power.  Cooper 
achieves this by examining how ‘excess’ is articulated by groups through activities that 
exist at the margins of society by virtue of features, such as religion, sexuality or animal 
welfare.  The hunting of animals, for example, would not normally be seen as part of the 
state but the hunt can be seen as part of the state structure when groups use it as a device 
to link a variety of processes, norms, and practices.  This does not mean that Coopers 
methodological approach is that of ‘anything goes’.  As Cooper explains there are 
limitations, but these limitations exist in terms of the sources used, as opposed to the 
constructivist tools, such as, concepts and theory employed by Loughlin and Vincent-
Jones.  
 
The choices exercised by the theorist in terms of construction are quite varied.  It could 
be argued that Loughlin opts for utility, in that the redefined concepts ultimately enhance 
the weight of the theory of juridification.  Vincent-Jones incremental approach represents 
certainty.  The basis for the study is that of accuracy and each subsequent stage of 
                                                 
15  M. Dean Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 93-94 
16  Above n. 5. (1998), 4 
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development can be traced back to this basis.  Furthermore, the weight attached to each 
stage of development is enhanced due to the accuracy which underpins the whole 
analysis.  Coopers choice is quite different in that it is more important to include as wide 
a range of knowledge as is possible, legal and non-legal, although there are rational 
limitations.  In other words, fruitfulness is the guiding principle. 
 
b.  Perspective 
 
Each of the theorists draws upon a non-legal discipline.  Loughlin’s analysis draws upon 
political theory, in particular, functionalism which is described as a critical examination 
of the 'reasoning process of the courts in order to expose the value assumptions on which 
they rest'.17  Loughlin argues that ‘traditional legal theory’ is not “indicative of the reality 
of relations within the administrative-political system” and its relationship with law.18 
 
Whilst Loughlin argues that the functionalist style facilitates the development of legal 
analysis, it is possible to argue that the style is also capable of the converse, controlling 
the development of legal analysis.  In the context of Loughlin’s analysis this ‘control’19 
can be identified as assuming three distinct forms, that of limiting, directing and 
structuring.  Limiting occurs by way of restricting the connection of law exclusively to 
political decision making.  The justification for this is the representation of law as the 
product of specific historical political events and the desire to create a realistic model.  
Loughlin is dismissive of alternative forms of decision making, most notably 
administrative decision making.  Yet in the context of the central-local relationship 
administrative decision making has been shown to have impact in terms of the ability of 
local authorities to make rules, even when the ability to make rules has supposedly been 
removed through juridifying policies such as CCT.20  The problem for administrative 
decision making is that by its nature it is difficult to represent as the master of a process 
of social evolution since it is generally perceived to be the facilitator of that process.21   
 
The functionalist style also enables Loughlin to direct the form of law’s connection with 
politics in that the connection is in respect of political decision making rather than the 
works of political scientists on concepts such as the state or power or even political 
theory, its application or development.  Functionalism as a theory is not deployed, only 
the functionalist style, since to apply the theory would require explanation in order to 
meet the conditions of the theory.  In other words, the connection is with the practical 
rather than the theoretical.  The functionalist approach is used as an investigative tool to 
overcome the evaluative failings of legal analysis.   
 
                                                 
17  M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 172 
18  Above n. 3 (1989), 25 
19  See D. Feldman, 'Judicial Review: A Way of Controlling Government', Public Administration, Vol. 66, 
Spring 1988, page 21. 
20  See B. Mauthe ‘District Auditors and Decision Making in the Central-Local Government Relationship’ 
[1999] Anglo-American Law Review 447; B. Mauthe, ‘The Notion of Rules and Rule-Making in the 
Central-Local Government Relationship’ [2000] Anglo-American Law Review 315 
21  H. Simon Administrative Behaviour (New York: The Free Press, 4th ed, 1997) 
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Finally, structuring enables Loughlin to make explicit the goals and values to be deployed 
in constructing the model.  For example, legal analysis is first directed towards political 
decision making and informed that such decision making occurs prior to legal decision 
making.  This allows legal analysis to ignore the actual details of political decision 
making, deploying it instead as descriptive explanatory background.  It also confines 
legal analysis to proper constitutional principles, such as the status of local government as 
a decision making body within the wider institutional structure of the state.   
 
The connection by legal analysis with political theory is complex.  In some respects 
Loughlin has adopted a political theory yet manages to deploy it in a non-theoretical 
manner in order to construct a legal theory.  Ultimately, it could be argued that it does not 
matter what form of model Loughlin produces, which methodology is used, whether the 
model is ‘realistic’/‘correct’ or what form or manner of political theory is deployed.  
What Loughlin does achieve is to facilitate a wider framework for legal analysis of the 
constitutional lacuna which the central-local relationship was perceived to represent. 
 
Whilst Loughlin is explicit in seeking to link law with a non-legal discipline, such a link 
is not so expressive within Vincent-Jones analysis.  Certainly, the first impression of 
Vincent-Jones analysis is that it is firmly entrenched in law.  Not only is there an 
examination of a legal mechanisms, CCT practices, the evaluation occurs against a 
coherent body of law, namely contract law.  In the subsequent development of the model 
of ‘contractual governance’, this too is evaluated against the legal theory of autopoiesis.  
However, there is a link with a non-legal discipline, namely economics, although this 
connection is rooted deep within the subject matter of the analysis, the emerging CCT 
practices in local authority service provision.  However, the dilemma facing Vincent-
Jones is that the ‘market’ for local authority services is not a true market but a quasi-
market.  Accordingly, legal analysis which draws upon neoclassical economics, such as 
pure contract law, cannot apply, nor can the ‘new’ economic approach to law which 
focuses upon non-market law,22 such as the family.23  However, the existence of the 
quasi-market, does facilitate the deployment of legal analysis which focuses on the 
regulation of economic systems and the legal forms which maintain them, in other words, 
systems analysis and in particular, autopoiesis.  Systems are self regulating mechanisms 
which seek to perpetuate their own existence whilst autopoietic systems take the notion 
of perpetuation further into that of self-reproduction.24  As an autopoietic system law is 
self-reproducing in that it ultimately produces new legal acts.   
 
The attraction of autopoiesis for Vincent-Jones is this feature of self-reproduction in that 
it facilitates explanation of the impact of CCT on local authority decision-making.  CCT 
caused local authorities to alter their internal organisation and decision-making 
procedures.  There occurred a fundamental shift ‘from vertically integrated or 
                                                 
22  P. Burrows and C. E. Veljanovski (eds), The Economic Approach to Law (London: Butterworths, 1981) 
2 
23  G. S. Becker The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1977) 
24  See N. Luhman, ‘The self-reproduction of the Law and its limits’ in G. Teubner (ed), Dilemmas of Law 
in the Welfare State (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,1985) and G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System 
(London: Blackwell, 1993) 
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hierarchical organisations’ where social order and expectations were maintained through 
centralised command, bureaucratic administrative procedures to that of markets which 
require a separate institutional ordering and normative guarantees against risks and 
uncertainties that naturally arise in competitive contexts where the self-interest of 
business operators conflict’.25  The self-reproduction occurs through local authorities 
‘neutralising’ the legislation by adopting strategies of minimal compliance which left 
their core values intact.   
 
A further attraction of autopoietic systems is their closed and self-referencing nature.  An 
economic system, for example, will only recognise economic norms and not legal norms.  
Legal norms are ‘external noise’ which the economic system will filter and reconstruct in 
accordance with its own rationality of efficiency.26  In other words, law works indirectly 
through ‘reflexion structures’ that encourage within the systems a self-reflection on the 
norms and values that should be guiding decision-making.  In the context of CCT, local 
authorities self-reflection resulted in the adoption of ‘the logic of competition, accounting 
separateness and a quasi-market organisation’.27  
 
There is merit to Vincent-Jones analysis.  In terms of autopoiesis, Vincent-Jones is able 
to affirm much of its notions and, ironically, address some of its main criticisms.  
Autopoiesis, for example, has been criticised for its non-empirical base and the absence 
of a ‘regulatory crisis’.  Vincent-Jones analysis is an empirical study of a ‘crisis’ period 
in local government.  A further criticism of autopoiesis is its tendency towards ‘grand 
theory’ – a criticism that can also be levelled at Loughlin.  However, whilst this flaw is 
not evident in Vincent-Jones analysis the potential is there in terms of the methodology in 
that Vincent-Jones predilection to lift the analysis in stages could, if taken to the ultimate, 
result in the creation of a grand theory of local authority governance.  
 
A final criticism is that of the intricacy of the analysis which occurs on two levels.  
Firstly, in terms of the analysis itself, it could be argued that the outcome of Vincent-
Jones analysis is an evaluation of the responsive and reflective nature of law and the 
development of legal theory rather than an evaluation of the substantive law either in the 
context of contract or local government.  In other words, Vincent-Jones analysis does not 
remain within the social framework from which it originated but moves into a 
jurisprudential context and therefore becomes removed from the reality which it sought to 
explain.   
 
Secondly, there is complexity in the terms of the theoretical lineage of the analysis.  
Whilst it was possible to identify the route which has lead to the construction of Vincent-
Jones analysis, unravelling the route of construction of the concepts and theories that he 
deploys reveals an intensely complex web.  Explained simplistically, systems analysis, 
for example, was initially developed in engineering and physics.  It was then adopted by 
social scientists, ultimately discredited and then abandoned although it has been deployed 
by law through the theory of autopoiesis.  Autopoiesis itself was developed in biology 
                                                 
25  Above n. 4 (1998), 374 
26  J. Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ [1996] Modern Law Review 24 
27  Above n. 2 (1998), 373.  See also note 8 above for an alternative interpretation on the impact of CCT. 
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and adopted by ’sociology of law’ thinkers in order to explain phenomena occurring in 
regulatory analysis28 although the existence of the phenomenon, i.e. a crisis, is a matter 
of debate.  Regulation is fundamentally a political-economic concept29 and systems 
theory is just one approach, albeit one that is increasingly used for the analysis of law.30  
At each stage of development, theories will have been constructed to solve a particular 
problem.  If knowledge of that particular problem is not passed to the next stage of 
development then all the values, norms, definitions, flaws, etc that went into the 
construction will pass into the new development unrecognised.  New theories ‘envelop’ 
the old theories but the concepts which link one theory to another may not always 
demonstrate con 31tinuity but discontinuity.  
                                                
 
Accordingly, given the intricacies of the theoretical development, the link between 
Vincent-Jones analysis and economics could be described as tenuous, but it does exist.  
Vincent-Jones never sought to explain an economic reality but to identify why law 
behaves the way it does in a particular economic situation.  In other words, the economic 
situation, just as Loughlin’s political situation, is the catalyst for an analysis on the nature 
of law. 
 
The non-legal discipline which Cooper draws upon is that of sociology.  In particular, 
Cooper draws on Foucault’s work of governmentality.32  The notion of governmentality 
is counterpoised to statist conceptions of power which Foucault regards as dominating 
modern analysis of social relations.  Foucault argues that to represent power as something 
which is institutional or prohibitive, does not explain the diverse and infinitesimal power 
relations that permeates all aspects of society.  In other words, to focus exclusively upon 
law does not represent reality, but to identify reality it is necessary to acknowledge that 
law, politics, economics, etc are part of a complex web of power.  Loughlin and Vincent-
Jones would agree with this argument but differ from Cooper in terms of their 
identification of how the various powers are arranged.  For Loughlin, law and politics are 
juxtaposed but politics presupposes law.  A consequence of this presupposition is that 
laws, which are the product of political activity (which is its self established in the form 
of law), will posses legal validity and yet be free of extra-legal connections, such as 
politics.33  Vincent-Jones takes this argument further in that politics is excluded even 
when laws are used to pursue specific ideological goals, such as, the use of markets.  
Cooper challenges the notion that law is a normatively closed tool for government policy.  
Law, like politics, is a technique of state power and can be subject to ‘local interpretation 
 
28  See H. Rottleuthner ‘Biological Metaphors in Legal Thought’ in G. Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A 
New Approach to Law and Society (1988) page 97; M. King ‘The ‘Truth about Autopoiesis’ [1993] 
Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 20, page 218 
29  A. Ogus, Regulation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 1 
30  See B. Lange, ‘Understanding Regulatory Law: Empirical Versus Systems-theoretical Approaches’, 
[1998] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 449 
31  See M. Tiles,  Bachelard, Science and Objectivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
32  See G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); A. Hunt and G. Wickham, Foucault and Law (London: Pluto 
Press, 1994) and A. Barry. T Osborne and N. Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
33  The same argument could be applied to Vincent-Jones but with the notion of politics replaced with that 
of the market place. 
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and responses’ which in turn are driven by ideological goals.  In other words, law can 
never exist separate from politics even once laws come into existence.  Even the 
interpretation of law and the response of institutions to law represents a form of political 
activity.   
 
This desire for the inclusion of a diversity of power relations is manifested within 
Cooper’s analysis in two ways.  Firstly, Cooper goes beyond the traditional bi-
institutional perspective of central government and local government to include civil 
bodies that speak about religion, sexuality and animal rights.  These bodies do not 
possess formal legal powers but they do influence decision making.  However, because of 
the breadth of agencies that are used, this means that Cooper’s analysis must always 
remain at the meso level.  It can never be used to evaluate decision making at the macro 
level, such as Loughlin, or even to form the basis of construction of a macro level model, 
such as Vincent-Jones.  Whilst these wider/higher forms of analysis are not part of 
Cooper’s goal, as a limitation it could be argued that such a limitation does not represent 
a flaw, since Coopers aim is exposure rather than explanation or evaluation.  
Alternatively, as a limitation it may be perceived as a form of underdetermination in that 
once reality is exposed Cooper leaves nothing to provide for further development.  Of 
course, this argument assumes that development, or the need to create further theory or to 
facilitate the further creation of theory, is the desire of theory and theorists.  The 
approach also asserts, albeit covertly, that any alternative theoretical explanations are 
‘unreal’.   
 
Secondly, Cooper’s approach allows for the inclusion of ‘narrative’.  Narrative is the use 
of biographical information, for example, where someone tells of their involvement or 
perspective concerning a particular incident or conflict.34  This verbal response of 
individuals is used by Cooper to demonstrate the interaction of law with people, politics, 
history, geography, identity, norms etc.  It is an approach that neither Loughlin nor 
Vincent-Jones could deploy although Vincent-Jones will have acquired ‘biographical 
information’ as part of the empirical base.  The information is not used because within 
the context of methodology deployed such subject matter comes to represents objective 
observations.  However, for Cooper, biographical information represents part of the text 
of the conflict.  Again, a potential criticism of the use of narrative is that it limits analysis 
to the micro level. 
 
c.  Justification 
 
Justification relates to the reasons that the various theorists present in terms of sources 
and choices.  Loughlin, for example, specifically wishes to construct a model of the 
central-local relationship that is ‘realistic’.35  Furthermore, this realism is to be achieved 
by adopting as the ‘principal focus the examination of the manner in which the normative 
structures of law can contribute to the tasks of guidance, control and evaluation in 
government’.36  However, in creating this realistic and normative model, Loughlin begins 
                                                 
34  Generally see A. Cavarero Relating Narratives (London: Routledge, 2000) 
35  Above n. 3. (1989), 25 
36  Above n. 17 (1992), 264 
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from a descriptive premise, the evaluative failings of law, and then translates this into a 
normative premise, of how central government has employed its superior legal status in a 
relationship where law did not matter.  Loughlin’s translations are possible because the 
concepts developed by Elliot and Grant have become intuitive in that they are accepted as 
a priori truths within legal analysis.  The irony of this path of construction is that the 
reality and the objectivity of the model is not dependant upon Loughlin’s discovery of the 
political use of law but the passivity and the subjectivity37 of the concepts. 
 
It could also be argued that what Loughlin represents as ‘reality’ could in fact be 
represented as ‘correctness’.  Reality represents ‘what is’, or fact, whilst ‘correctness’ is 
the product of procedures which result in a determinable end model –something which 
‘ought to be’ rather than ‘what is’.  Accordingly, it is possible to produce a model that is 
‘correct’ but not necessarily ‘real’ since such an end model is a product of the chosen 
process of discovery rather than the actual discovered knowledge.  It is also a method that 
validates the model since, like the method, it is reasoned and coherent.  The outcome of 
such an approach is that any challenge to the model also represents a challenge to the 
method.  This, in turn makes any challenge to the model problematical.  After all, it is 
easier to ‘trash’ a ‘real’ model since all that is required is new evidence whereas to 
challenge a ‘correct’ model requires not just evidence but the identification as to why and 
what is flawed in the model.  Loughlin’s model has been shown to contain flaws38 but it’s 
‘correctness’ is so entrenched within Public Law that there have been few direct 
challenges. 
 
Vincent-Jones also wishes to provide an explanation of reality but, it is suggested, the 
reality which Vincent-Jones identifies is ultimately a representation of practice and 
theory.  This assertion can be found through examination of the methodology employed.  
The analysis begins with two forms of knowledge, CCT practices and contract law.  The 
CCT practices are empirical evidence which is represented as newly acquired factual 
knowledge.  Contract law, however, represents a pre-formed body of knowledge which 
possesses specific features, such as, abstract elements39 and conditions40 which 
ultimately provide the framework for its existence as a body of knowledge.  It is against 
this body of knowledge that the emerging CCT practises are tested and the outcome is the 
construction of a model which is represented as ‘near-contractual governance’.  This 
model then becomes the object of further testing against another body of knowledge, the 
theory of autopoiesis, which is more abstract, less conditioned and possesses a more 
limited framework than contract law.  The outcome is yet a further model, ‘contractual 
governance’ which in turn possesses the potential for further testing.  Testing occurs 
against yet another theory, that of governmentality, which is again a theory that is more 
abstract, less conditioned and possesses a more of a limited framework than the original 
                                                 
37  The subjectivity arises because unlike Loughlin, neither Elliot nor Grant sought to construct a model 
based on a particular perspective.  Elliot and Grant also include both normative and descriptive elements 
within their analysis. 
38  Above n. 8 and 20 (2000) 
39  For example, the notion of consideration. 
40  Such as the rules or circumstances which must be met in order for a contract to exist. 
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premise for construction, that of contract law.  The analysis proceeds through a series of 
stages which ultimately represents a hierarchy of constructs.   
 
A potential problem with this incremental approach is that the relationship between the 
original approximation and the ultimate approximation could become remote, possibly 
misplaced or even lost.41  Furthermore, with each stage of development the potential for 
abstraction and generalisation increases (a consequence of the emerging gap between 
each approximation) and the cycle for development becomes endless.  Ironically, the 
whole process is represented as rational and objective, yet there is irrationality, it lies in 
the first step, that is, the choice of foundation from which to begin the analysis.   
 
In some respects Vincent-Jones methodology is more open-ended than Loughlin’s.  The 
potential for the construction of models is infinite in that there is no limit other than the 
availability of suitable theories.  Loughlin’s model is, by contrast, finite in that it does not 
invite, or leave open, an avenue for development or revision.  Instead, the only revision 
available is to test the validity of the theory itself which can ultimately lead either to its 
affirmation or destruction.  
Like Loughlin and Vincent-Jones, Cooper also seeks to provide an explanation of reality 
but through an interpretation, or a ‘reading’, of specific events on the basis that political 
conflict is ‘fluid’ and ‘constantly evolving’.  The focus is on method as ‘history’ rather 
than method as deployment of a particular perspective (Loughlin) or method as 
development of theory (Vincent-Jones).  The approach is directly attributable to the 
theorist that Cooper draws upon, namely ‘Foucauldian political analysis, discourse 
theory, socio-legal studies and cultural geography’.42  However, it is possible to argue 
that the contingencies which Cooper includes are so diverse that they are incapable of 
producing coherent analysis of a phenomenon.  Except that coherence only matters if the 
desired outcome is to identify error or accuracy.  Since Coopers aim is to identify an 
alternative perception of reality, diversity, because of its breath should only produce 
exposure.  The key to this exposure lies in how the contingencies are structured, in other 
words, there must be some commonality.  Furthermore, this commonality goes beyond 
the mere assertion that there is commonality or that the only limitation is that of 
‘sources’.  In other words, in there is a rationality to Coopers methodology.  For example, 
Cooper argues that reality can be drawn from projections of relationships but, for the 
relationships to be valid there must be filters.  In other words, Cooper states what ‘real 
history’ is to be included, rather than what is to be excluded.  Ultimately each ‘real 
history’ becomes a ‘representation’ of a relationship which then forms the basis for a 
formal structure which then becomes the encapsulation of the particular phenomena.  
Ironically, the outcome is much the same as that of Loughlin and Vincent-Jones, the 
creation of a model/theory except that the aim is exposure rather than explanation or 
description.  
 
d.  Summary 
 
                                                 
41  Vincent-Jones does attempt to address this problem through the extensive use of footnotes.  
42  Above n. 5 (1998) Preface 
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The above examination on how and why the theories of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and 
Cooper have been constructed reveals few shared features from which to identify a basis 
for interconnection.  It could also be argued that the examination highlights, even further, 
how mutually incompatible the works are.  Given the difficulties in connecting the works, 
in terms of theory, either as form or structure, it may be that theory is not the most 
effective method for achieving a connection.  In other words, it might be more effective 
to abandon theory and consider an alternative mechanism for the explanation of 
knowledge, such as concepts. 
 
Concepts As A Mechanism For The Explanation of Knowledge  
 
There are many definitions as to ‘what’ is a concept43 although basically they can be 
described as an abstract representation which attempts to use words to portray reality.44  
The terms concepts and theory are occasionally used interchangeably but as structures for 
the explanation of knowledge they are quite distinct.  Theory is, for example, informal in 
nature in that there are no particular rules regarding its construction.  The above 
examination of the works of the theorists revealed great diversity and incompatibility 
which would certainly indicate that, within the context of legal analysis on local 
government and the central local relationship, particular rules regarding theory 
construction do not appear to exist.  Furthermore, even the role of theory was found to be 
dissimilar.  Cooper, for example, seeks to use theory as a form of exposure rather than as 
a method for explanation.  Concepts, on the other hand, appear to be the converse of 
theories.  As a mechanism for the explanation of knowledge, concepts can seem to be 
both formal and fixed.  Consider, for example, the notion of juridification.  If a study on 
local government and the central-local relationship uses the notion of juridifcation as a 
concept, then for the concept to be understood there need only be a reference to a 
definition, such as that proffered by Loughlin.45  It would be unnecessary to offer any 
further explanation since the concept would always be understood by virtue of the 
referenced definition.  However, if the study wishes to use the notion of juridification as a 
hypothesis, then as a hypothesis it would be necessary to identify what are the features of 
juridification deployed by Loughlin.  These features would be explained and it would be 
argued that, whilst it may be thought that these processes have occurred, it must be 
established that they have indeed occurred.  In other words, juridification cannot be 
assumed it must be explained, identified and then proved.  Accordingly, the distinction 
between a theory and a concept lies with where knowledge can be found.  In respect of 
concepts, knowledge is pre-defined, whilst for theory, knowledge must be discovered 
however certain it may be thought that the knowledge exists.   
 
Concepts And Legal Analysis On Local Government And The Central-Local 
Relationship 
 
                                                 
43  Generally see M. Weitz Theories of Concepts (London: Routledge, 1988)  
44  Generally see W. B. Gallie ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ in M. Black (ed.) The Importance of 
Language (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962); P. Thagard Conceptual Revolutions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 
45  Above n. 3 (1989) 
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The use of concepts within legal analysis on local government and the central-local 
relationship is not unusual but, it is suggested, that the matter of how concepts are used, 
as a method for explanation, remains unexplored.  Accordingly, it is proposed to consider 
how the various theorists use concepts in order to identify a number of perceptions 
regarding them. 
 
Firstly, it can be found that concepts are generally presented as being fixed and inflexible 
in terms of the knowledge that they represent.  The use of the concept of juridification, as 
indicated above, would appear to affirm this representation.  Yet consider the concept of 
law as employed by Loughlin and Cooper.  For Loughlin, law specifically relates to the 
formal structures from which statute and case law are produced whilst Cooper seeks to 
include a wide range of norms; social, political and even religious – hence the ‘governing 
out of order’.  This diversity in the understanding of the presentation of law as a concept 
would suggest that concepts are not in fact rigid or fixed structures but possess an 
element of flexibility or ‘openness’.  In other words, the pre-defined knowledge which 
makes up the understanding of the concept can be altered according to the context in 
which the concept is used.  This flexibility allows for the presentation of alternative 
understandings by theorists who appear to share little beyond that of the context within 
which they write. 
 
Secondly, within legal analysis on local government and the central-local relationship 
theory is used as the primary mechanism for the presentation of knowledge.  Concepts 
are deployed as an explanatory tool but they are generally represented as a secondary or 
subsidiary mechanism to that of theory.  Consider for example, the concepts of 
legalization and restructuring which form part of Loughlin’s theory of juridification.  Yet, 
the manner in which Vincent-Jones deploys concepts, as a means for altering the level of 
analysis, would indicate that concepts do not have to exist within the domain of theory.  
Concepts posses a flexibility, in that they can be part of the structure of theory, yet exist 
apart from theory and at the same time facilitate theory.  In other words, just like theory, 
concepts can exist as a stand alone mechanism for the presentation of knowledge, 
ultimately even facilitating the explanation of complex structures where diverse and 
disparate theories may exist.46    
 
Accordingly, given the difficulties in connecting the works of the theorists in terms of 
theory, it is proposed to explore whether concepts may be able to facilitate such a 
connection. 
 
Concepts As A Mechanism For The Presentation Of Knowledge In Respect Of Legal 
Analysis On Local-Government And The Central-Local Relationship 
 
If concepts are to form the basis for the connection of the work of the three theorists, then 
the questions arises, which concepts should be deployed?  The most obvious choice 
would be to select those concepts already used by the theorists, such as law, politics or 
government.  Except that in using these concepts there are the risk of transferring the 
                                                 
46  See B. Mauthe ‘The Notion of Sovereignty and its Presentation within Public Law: a Critique on the use 
of Theory and Concepts’[2005] Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 63 
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predefined knowledge attached to these concepts.  Consider, for example the diverse 
interpretation employed by Loughlin and Cooper in respect of the concept of law.  
Accordingly, it is proposed to draw upon a number of concepts which should provide 
scope, simplicity, consistency and accuracy.   
 
Within the work of each of the three theorists it is possible to identify a concept which 
provides a distinctive representation of their analysis.  It can be argued, for example, that 
Loughlin focuses on ‘structure’, Vincent-Jones on ‘rules’, and Cooper focuses upon 
‘ideology’.  In other words, the connection between all three theorists lies, not through 
theory, but through the examination of these concepts.  Whilst these concepts may 
possess specific representation within the context of a particular theorist but, as concepts, 
they also have common elements which can be found within the works of all the 
theorists.  It is proposes to examine this commonality. 
 
a.  Structure 
 
A notional definition of structure is that it relates to framework, the various components 
within the framework, how these components relate to one another and how things, in 
general, are organised within the framework.  Each of the theorists contains aspects of 
‘structure’ within their work.  Furthermore, ‘structure’ can be identified in assuming 
numerous forms. 
 
Loughlin focuses upon the institutional structure of central government and local 
government.  Central to Loughlin’s perception of institutional structure is that local 
government is constrained and cannot choose or even define its relationship with central 
government.  Any defining of the institutional relationship must be done either by central 
government or the judiciary through the mechanism of law.  The solution offered by 
Loughlin to this constraint is also structural in nature.  Initially, Loughlin argued in 
favour of a written constitution.47  This solution, whilst being the most ideal, was also 
recognised as being the most unlikely and ultimately Loughlin settled for the creation of a 
constitutional norm of ‘locality’.48  Although the normative status of the level of 
protection has altered, the focus of protection remains the same, the institutional 
relationship of central government and local government. 
 
The second facet of structure that can be identified within Loughlin’s analysis lies in 
respect of the relationship of law to politics.  Loughlin argues that political decision 
making exists prior to legal decision making in that a political decision to implement a 
particular policy may result in legislation.  However, once the political decision has been 
made, and law is produced, then the relationship between law and politics ceases.  How 
this represents a form of structure is that politics and law represent separate disciplines 
yet Loughlin’s approach allows for the articulation of a relationship.  However, there are 
hidden facets within Loughlin’s approach since it is only the activities within the realm of 
law that enables the structural relationship with politics to be identified and maintained.  
Furthermore, the sequential position occupied by law within this structure ultimately 
                                                 
47  M. Loughlin The Constitutional Status of Local Government (Commission for Local Democracy, 1994) 
48  Above n. 3 (1996) 
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enables law to ‘ignore’ politics from a specified, but self determined position.  It also 
allows law to be selective as to which political activities to focus upon.  Whilst the 
approach facilitates the inclusion of issues which previously were not possible within 
legal analysis of the central-local relationship,49 it also acts a restraint in that law is seen 
as both a facilitator and enabler, but the limitations of law, whether conceptual or 
practical, are never explored.50  
 
Vincent-Jones within his analysis focuses on a different structure from that of the central-
local relationship.  Central government, through the use of law, requires local authorities 
to enter into an alternative, non-public law framework, that of the marketplace.  Whereas 
Loughlin would focus on how this framework emerged, Vincent-Jones is more interested 
in exploring how local authorities operate within the new framework, particularly in 
respect of their relationship with private contractors.  Whilst Loughlin represented 
structure as hierarchical in nature, for Vincent-Jones, structure is linear.  The focus is also 
that of decision making but decision making based on relationships of equality within the 
market place.  As a consequence, the concept of ‘structure’ is not a dominant feature in 
terms of the content of Vincent-Jones’ work and it only becomes a recognizable facet 
when there is a change in the structure.  For example, when the market place is created 
and when it is altered as a consequence of the switch from CCT to Best Value.  Such a 
change in the structure affects all the parties, hence its linear perception, unlike the 
operation of hierarchy within Loughlin’s model.  It could be argued that where structure 
does dominate Vincent-Jones’ analysis is in relation to methodology.  The incremental 
approach represents a discrete structure in that there is interplay between theory and 
practice within a strictly defined framework. 
 
Cooper offers a very different perception regarding structure from that of Loughlin and 
Vincent-Jones.  Although no formal definition of the concept can be found, nor is it a 
dominant feature of the analysis, structure can be found within the content of the analysis 
through the use of attributes such as community and geography.  Cooper offers a spatial 
perception of the concept in that structure is a ‘stretched out’ notion which consists of a 
configuration of relations that operate at different levels and different ways.  In other 
words, structure is about space, in particular local space, and how things are organised 
and done within that space.  Where the boundary of local space ends does not matter, nor 
is it even an issue, since it is the activities within the local space that represents structure 
rather than space per se.  Whilst different, there is some similarity to Loughlin and 
Vincent-Jones in that they too focus on activities albeit in respect of institutions 
(Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary) or a context (the market place).  Such wide 
variations on the concept would suggest that structure can be represented as multi-
dimensional in nature, almost three dimensional, but, it is only by combining the works 
of the three theorists that this perception of structure in the context of local government 
can be found.   
 
b.  Rules 
 
                                                 
49  Such as the central-local relationship as a mechanism for distributive justice. 
50  Such as highlighting the limitations of law in the absence of a formal written constitutional framework. 
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None of the theorists none offer a specific definition as to what constitutes a rule.  
However it is possible to identify a number of features concerning rules.   
 
For Vincent-Jones, rules lie at the core of the analysis.  Vincent-Jones observations on 
rule making by local authorities within the CCT regime provide the basis for the 
construction of the contractual governance model.  This, in turn, leads to the construction 
of the theory of responsibilization.  In other words, rules serve a dual purpose, those of 
subject and method.  The rule making practices of local authorities represent observed 
knowledge, in other words they are Vincent-Jones’s subject matter.  But the explanation 
of these observations follows a reasoned progression, or method.  Initially the knowledge 
is used in the construction of models and latterly in the deployment of theory.  Whilst the 
progression is not represented as following a specific ‘rule bound’, formula, its 
continuous application by Vincent-Jones suggests, at least, the existence of a convention 
for the construction of models and theories. 
 
For Loughlin, rules also lie at the core of the analysis in that legal rules, such as statute 
and case law, form the basis for the theory of juridification.  Furthermore, Loughlin’s 
perception of legal rules is that they represent the only real form of ‘control’ within the 
hierarchical structure of central government and local government. 
 
Cooper does not focus on rules per se but on conflicts which can be based not only on 
law but also upon symbolic and cultural norms, factors which are often dismissed by 
lawyers as being irrelevant.  These conflicts are about the stretching of the boundaries of 
authority rather than producing a definitive perception of what constitutes a rule or law.   
 
Again it is possible to identify from the three theorists different facets of the same 
concept.  Vincent-Jones perception of rules is about one area of law, contract law, 
accommodating another area of law, CCT.  There is no formal requirement for these two 
areas of law to accommodate one another, just that the consequence would be the failure 
of the local authority market with the possibility of direct interference by central 
government.  It is therefore in the self interest of local authorities to find mechanisms for 
accommodation.  Such economic and political factors are not apparent within Vincent-
Jones analysis as the rules which emerge are represented to be a consequence of the 
responsive and reflexive nature of law.  Loughlin focuses upon the authority that law 
possesses as a consequence of the operation of politics.  There is a presumption that the 
power and authority of law are synonymous and that rules are the outcome of command 
and legitimacy.  Cooper focuses on conflicts where law is only one of many factors.  No 
explanation is offered regarding the nature of law, nor are there presumptions about what 
law can do.  Yet, authority, power and command, features of law, exists within Coopers 
analysis, they are just not the overtly formal mechanisms identified by Vincent-Jones and 
Loughlin.  This would suggest that in the central-local relationship the concept of rules is 
not static but depends upon numerous factors, such as context and the relationships being 
evaluated.   
 
c.  Ideology 
 
 19
Cooper defines ideology as ‘the various frameworks of meaning which justifies, 
legitimise, promote and emerge out particular networks of social relations’.51  
Furthermore, ideology is not singular and its role is to create discourse.  In the context of 
governance, ideology goes beyond beliefs and norms to include methods and paradigms.  
Accordingly, even conflicts which appear to be non-ideological, such as the banning of 
hunting52 or the increasing of Christianity’s profile within schools53, possess an 
ideological component, since these issues ultimately concern differences in values and 
objectives.   
 
Within Loughlin’s analysis the process of juridification is a direct consequence of the 
election of a Conservative government in 1979 with a specific ideological remit 
concerning the role and function of the state.  The legal conflicts which emerge between 
central government and local government in the 1980’s are a direct consequence of this 
change in ideology.  To some extent, Loughlin is chronicling the change in ideology.  For 
Vincent-Jones, ideology underpins how rules emerge within the context of local authority 
transacting in the market place.  Here, it is the impact of the new ideology on rules and 
rules making that are being chronicled.  The conflicts which Cooper discuses are about 
how far dominant ideologies extend and lesser or alternative ideologies can challenge, 
through law and other mechanisms, dominant ideologies.  In other words, how far does 
ideology operate as a form of control, beyond law. 
 
It is suggested that ideology is a significant concept within the central-local relationship.  
Furthermore it links in with structure, since structural issues can often be a consequence 





The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that although legal analysis of local government 
and the central-local relationship is incompatible in terms of theory, it is possible to 
connect the disparate analysis through the use of concepts.  In order to achieve this aim, 
the notion of theory was explored in terms of its usage as either a form of explanation or 
as a structure for the explanation of knowledge.  Far from revealing a means to connect 
the works of Loughlin, Vincent-Jones and Cooper, beyond the context within which they 
write, this approach appeared to enhance the diversity of their analysis.  Accordingly, it 
was concluded that theory was not an appropriate device, by which to connect the works, 
and that it may be more effective to consider the use of an alternative mechanism for the 
presentation of knowledge, such as that of concepts.  The nature of concepts was then 
considered along the perceptions concerning their usage within legal analysis on local 
government and the central-local relationship.  It was found that, as an explanatory 
mechanism, concepts possess an openness and flexibility and could even be used to 
explain complex structures.  Three concepts were then identified by which to evaluate the 
works of the theorist, those of structure, rules and ideology.  The resulting analysis was a 
                                                 
51  Above n. 5 (1994), 7–8 and 151–5.  For Loughlin see above n. 1 (1989). 
52  Above n. 5 (1998), Chapter 7 
53  Above n. 5 (1995) and (1998), Chapter 3 
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form of meta-explanation of a particular period in decision making within local 
government and the central-local relationship. 
 
It is suggested that the approach contained within this paper could be transferred to other 
areas of public law analysis where a number of disparate and diverse theories exist in 
respect of a particular phenomenon.  The approach has certainly been applied, with some 
success, in the respect of that most difficult of phenomenon with public law, 
sovereignty.54  Given the vast differences between the notion of sovereignty and the topic 
of local government and the central-local relationship, this would indicate that the 
approach possesses merit.   
 
 
54  Above n. 46 
